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Defense of Rawls: A Reply to Brock 
 
Abstract 
Cosmopolitans like Gillian Brock, Charles Beitz, and Thomas Pogge argue that the 
principles of justice selected and arranged in lexical priority in Rawls’ first original 
position would—and should for the same reasons as in the first—also be selected in 
Rawls’ second original position. After all, the argument goes, what reasons other than 
morally arbitrary ones do we have for selecting a second set of principles? A different, 
though undoubtedly related, point of contention is the cosmopolitan charge that Rawls 
fails to consider the unfavorable conditions that owe themselves to global factors. 
Perhaps there was a time when interconnectedness and interdependency between states 
was not a factor, but in the current global order, this is certainly not the case. While this 
paper will address other related cosmopolitan concerns mentioned in Brock’s work, it is 
these two points that are perhaps the two biggest threats to the Rawlsian project and, as 
such, it is these two points that will be the primary focus of this paper.  
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Along with Charles Beitz and Thomas Pogge, cosmopolitan Gillian Brock is professedly 
Rawlsian in sympathies when it comes to the theory of domestic justice Rawls advances in his 
landmark 1971 work A Theory of Justice (hereafter TJ). So it was much to the disappointment of 
Brock and other Rawlsian cosmopolitans1 to find out upon the release of Rawls’ book on 
international justice, The Law of Peoples (hereafter LP), that Rawls failed to extend his 
principles of domestic justice to a global level. Especially troubling to cosmopolitans was Rawls’ 
failure to extend his “difference principle”2 to a global level. The general complaint is that if 
Rawls is truly committed to the outcome of delegates deliberating—under conditions of 
impartiality, in the hypothetical position—behind an appropriate veil of ignorance on a domestic 
level, then consistency would require, for reasons I will explain below, that the deliberation 
process behind a second veil on an international level would yield support for a global difference 
principle.  
In what follows, I hope to defend Rawls against this charge of inconsistency between his 
earlier work on domestic justice and his later work on international justice. As I hope to show 
below, when Rawls shifts the discussion of justice from a domestic to an international level, 
contrary to these cosmopolitan criticisms, Rawls stays consistent with his prior liberal 
commitments. 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
*I!thank!Marcus!Arvan!for!his!helpful!comments.!Earlier!versions!of!this!paper!also!benefited!from!comments!from!
the!6th!Annual!Southeast!Philosophy!Conference,!and!the!18th!Annual!Pacific!University!Philosophy!Conference.!!
1!What!have!come!to!be!known!as!“Rawlsian!cosmopolitans”!support!Rawls’!theory!of!domestic!justice.!The!types!
of!claims!advanced!by!these!particular!cosmopolitans!are!not!against!Rawls’!principles!of!domestic!justice,!nor!
against!his!approach,!but!rather!they!are!against!Rawls’!failure!to!extend!these!same!principles!to!a!global!level.!!!!
2!Rawls’!“difference!principle”,!also!known!as!the!“maximin”!principle!of!welfare!economics,!states!that!economic!
inequalities!are!to!be!permitted!when!and!only!when!these!inequalities!work!to!the!maximum!benefit!of!the!least!
wellPoff!members!of!society.!!
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While a number of complaints have emerged in the wake of LP, the one I wish to focus 
on in this paper is the complaint that has been perhaps the greatest source of cosmopolitan 
lament: Rawls is inconsistent, in the sense that Rawls’ domestic theory is decidedly egalitarian 
while his international theory is anything but. The first part of this paper outlines this very 
complaint, as presented in Gillian Brock’s Global Justice.3 The second part of this paper argues 
that the Rawlsian project, correctly understood, is not as vulnerable to this central cosmopolitan 
criticism as Brock seems to suggest. I begin by offering what I take to be a fundamental, though 
perhaps often overlooked, key to understanding the Rawlsian project: a peoples’4 capacity for 
self-sufficiency. Ultimately, it is my intention to argue that this difference between peoples and 
individual citizens, working in tandem with the interests behind assigning lexical priority to the 
liberty principle, is sufficient for reconciling what Brock sees as an inconsistency between 
Rawls’ global and domestic justice. In what follows, I hope to demonstrate that it is precisely by 
different principles being selected—namely without a global difference principle—that Rawls is 
consistent. 
CENTRAL OBJECTIONS TO RAWLS’ THE LAW OF PEOPLES 
Against Rawls, Gillian Brock’s Global Justice presents the criticism at the forefront of 
cosmopolitan concerns: Rawls is tolerant of the type of economic injustices at the global level 
that Rawls is intolerant of at the domestic. Rather than extend his egalitarian difference principle 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
3!Gillian!Brock,!Global&Justice:&A&Cosmopolitan&Account!(Oxford:!Oxford!University!Press,!2009).!!
4!By!a!“peoples”,!Rawls!roughly!means!a!society.!For!the!distinction!between!peoples!and!states,!see!LP!pp!23P30.!!
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to a global level, Rawls introduces a less demanding “duty of assistance.”5 Rawls’ duty of 
assistance has fallen largely on unsympathetic ears. The general complaint is that duty of 
assistance allows for inequalities that are not to the benefit of the globally least well-off, which is 
something that his domestic level difference principle does not permit.   
Cosmopolitans argue that if structuring a global Society of Peoples behind an appropriate 
veil of ignorance (a veil which deprives us knowledge not of the world itself, but of our place in 
it), then factors such as place of birth and state boundaries are also arbitrary from a moral point 
of view. Just as the distribution of benefits and burdens should not be based on one’s sex, race, 
inherited status, or endowment of natural talents, it also should not be based on endowment of 
natural resources. In short, whatever reasons we had for accepting a domestic difference 
principle we also have for accepting a global one, given that place of birth is yet another arbitrary 
factor.  
Brock and fellow cosmopolitans maintain that just as sex, race, and natural talents are 
morally arbitrary, so is place of birth. As the argument goes, if we accept place of birth to be just 
one more in a long line of contingencies, then consistency would require that the principles 
selected would be those which work to the maximum advantage of the globally least well-off. 
That is to say, a global difference principle would be selected. Of all the misgivings voiced about 
LP, it is this principle that concerns cosmopolitans the most, and it is this principle that is the 
primary focus of this paper: the endorsement at the international level of principle 2a, the 
difference principle (or, what is known as the “maximin” principle of welfare economics).  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
5!According!to!Rawls,!all!that!a!selfPgoverning!peoples!owe!to!others!is!a!duty!of!assistance,!a!duty!to!“assist!
burdened!societies!to!become!full!members!of!the!Society!of!Peoples!and!to!be!able!to!determine!the!path!of!their!
own!future!for!themselves”!(LP,!pg!119).!!
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In short, Brock’s basic point is that Rawls’ exchange of a difference principle for a less 
ambitious duty of assistance6 falls short of his domestic egalitarianism, and is thereby 
inconsistent with his prior commitments. I will argue that this is not the case—in the sense that 
the interests being secured in LP are consistent with Rawls’ earlier commitments. Likewise, with 
respect to earlier commitments, Rawls’ LP both rests on and further develops as an answer to the 
“stability question” his idea of an “overlapping consensus”, originally mentioned—albeit by 
name only once—in TJ and further developed in post-TJ works. I will discuss this only as it 
relates to my main argument.  
CENTRAL TO UNDERSTANDING RAWLSIAN INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE 
Before going on to my main argument, one important piece of groundwork is necessary. It is 
here that we will look at how Rawls’ theory of international justice rests on an assumption of the 
self-sufficiency of states.7 Understanding the implications and motivations behind one of the 
eight global principles delegates would choose when deliberating is central, though perhaps often 
overlooked, to understanding the Rawlsian project—or at least to appreciating its consistency. 
Brock’s criticisms, and the survey of the defenses of Rawls offered in her work, do not mention 
the motivations behind this: “Peoples are free and independent, and their freedom and 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
6!There!are!two!(main)!readings!of!duty!of!assistance!in!the!literature:!one!“humanitarian”!(See!for!example!Tan,!
Justice&without&Borders!pp.!20P23),!the!other!“sufficientarian”!(See!for!example!Lea!Ypi,!Global&Justice&and&Avant<
Garde&Political&Agency&pp.!89P116).!For!reasons!that!will!become!clearer!later!on,!it!seems!Rawls’!work!is!more!
aligned!with!the!latter,!especially!given!Rawls!himself!stated!rather!explicitly!that!the!duty!of!assistance!has!a!
“target!and!cutoff!point”!(LP,!pg.!119)!and!that!it!served!a!specific!purpose,!which!will!also!make!more!sense!as!we!
go!on.!According!to!Rawls,!all!that!a!selfPgoverning!peoples!owe!to!others!(rather!than!a!global!difference!
principle)!is!a!duty!of!assistance,!a!duty!to!“assist!burdened!societies!to!become!full!members!of!the!Society!of!
Peoples!and!to!be!able!to!determine!the!path!of!their!own!future!for!themselves”!(LP,!pg!119).!
7!David!A.!Reidy!(2004)!emphasizes!the!importance!of!this!for!Rawls’!international!justice,!and!provides!a!much!
more!detailed!account,!though!he!puts!it!to!different!purposes.!I!owe!much!to!him!here.!!
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independence are to be respected by other peoples.”8 There is of course a lot that can be said 
about this, but what matters for our purposes here is simply how Rawls’ LP is informed by his 
convictions about the self-sufficiency of states.9  
By considering the motivation behind this we can understand Rawls’ LP as a 
continuation of his earlier work, and better appreciate its coherence. It is not that Rawls 
abandons earlier commitments from TJ, rather it is that Rawls is acknowledging that a peoples 
can live independently of other peoples in a way that individuals on a domestic level never 
could. That is to say, peoples have the capacity to be self-sufficient in a way that on a domestic 
level individuals do not.10 Also, a peoples can, despite its current standing, become self-
sustaining and live independently of other peoples in a way that individuals on a domestic level 
cannot.11  
This difference between peoples and individual citizens is significant to Rawls’ project. 
And it is this difference, I want to argue, that in tandem with the point I discuss below (the 
interests behind assigning lexical priority to the liberty principle—roughly defined as equal 
citizenship) explains why a different set of principles would be chosen, namely without a 
(global) difference principle. It is not that Rawls changes his position, but rather it is that 
Rawls—and delegates in the hypothetical position—acknowledge a significant difference 
between peoples and individual persons. 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
8!Rawls,!John.!The&Law&of&Peoples!(Cambridge,!Mass.:!Harvard!University!Press,!1999)!pg.!37.!
9!This!is!stated!perhaps!most!explicitly!on!pages!106P109,!LP.!
10!Rawls!states!this!perhaps!most!explicitly!later!on!in!LP!when!saying!“Surely!there!is!a!point!at!which!a!peoples’!
basic!needs!(estimated!in!primary!goods)!are!fulfilled!and!a!people!can!stand!on!its!own![italics!mine].”!(LP,!pg.!
119).!
11!For!both!similarities!and!differences!between!how!peoples!and!individual!citizens!see!themselves!as!free!and!
equal!with!“highestPorder!interests”!in!selfPdetermination,!see!LP!pg.!32P38.!
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Brock provides a generous survey of the popular defenses of Rawls just before her 
criticisms. These defenses by and large are based on the misunderstanding critics have 
concerning the purpose of Rawls’ work. These more-or-less turn on the idea that Rawls’ LP asks 
a less ambitious question: how should liberal peoples interact with non-liberal peoples. In short, 
they have as their starting point the idea that Rawls’ LP was primarily concerned with defining a 
realistic utopia.12 On the other hand, Joseph Heath’s point is that, “Just as Rawls’ primary 
objective in Theory of Justice was to argue against utilitarianism, in the Law of Peoples it is to 
dislodge realism.” I owe much to all of these accounts (especially Heath’s), but mine differs 
from theirs in that it relies heavily on this difference between peoples and individual citizens.  
DEFENSE AGAINST THE CHARGE OF INCONSISTENCY 
Hopefully having explained the relevant difference to Rawls between peoples and individuals, 
we are now in a better position to see Rawls’ refusal to globalize the difference principle as 
consistent with TJ. My defense here rests on something that Rawls stays committed to since his 
earliest work: the interests behind assigning lexical priority to the liberty principle,13 the priority 
of self-respect. 
Rawls’ duty of assistance has been criticized as objectionably modest for the reasons I 
have given above. Indeed, cosmopolitans are right to say the demands of duty of assistance are 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
12!With!respect!to!consistency,!it!is!from!this!that!flows!the!most!common!lines!of!defense!in!the!literature:!Rawls’!
realistic&utopia!requires!(global)!“overlapping!consensus”.!!(Which!is!wellPfounded!given!there!exists!an!even!
broader!range!of!irreconcilable!“comprehensive”!beliefs!worldwide!than!that!found!within!a!single!state.)!Rawls!is!
taking!seriously!the!fact&of&reasonable&pluralism!among!peoples,!analogous!with!his!political!conception!at!the!
domestic!level.!These!defenses!however,!even!by!their!own!admission,!align!Rawls’!LP!closer!to!PL.!See,!for!
example!Leif!Wenar,!“The!Unity!of!Rawls’!Work”,!(2004),!and!Stephen!Macedo,!“What!SelfPgoverning!Peoples!Owe!
to!One!Another:!Universalism,!Diversity,!and!the!Law!of!People”,!(2004).!!
13!Again,!the!liberty!principle!can!be!roughly!defined!as!equal&citizenship.!
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far from that of Rawls’ domestic difference principle.14 Duty of assistance allows for inequalities 
and the distribution of natural resources and talents that Rawls is intolerant of in TJ. But we are 
told very little about this in the domestic situation. Rawls’ duty of assistance does, however, 
build on groundwork laid earlier in TJ. 
While TJ primarily concerned itself with domestic justice, Rawls does mention in passing 
the “natural duties” owed between states, in a sense anticipating the duty of assistance he would 
later develop in his account of international justice.15 But beyond this, little is said in the way of 
what exactly this natural duty would mean for the international situation. Even Rawls’ first work 
on international justice, “The Law of Peoples” (1993)—an earlier paper by the same name as the 
book—makes no mention of a duty of assistance. It is not until we get to LP that Rawls puts 
forward the duty of assistance. While duty of assistance does in fact allow for inequalities that 
the difference principle does not, by selecting this different set of principles (again our focus 
being on the difference principle), Rawls is protecting the interests behind them rather than the 
principles themselves.  
Let us first consider the domestic situation. Simply put, according to Rawls, individuals’ 
wealth and their status in the social hierarchy cannot be guaranteed equal for any length of time. 
If one’s self-respect is tied to these things, knowledge of one’s subordinate ranking in a society 
can be a threat to one’s self-respect.16 While roles or statuses in a society cannot be guaranteed 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
14!For!a!compelling!case!that!the!duty!of!assistance’s!demands!are!greater!than!is!often!supposed,!see!David!Reidy!
(2007)!“A!Just!Global!Economy:!In!Defense!of!Rawls”.!
15!TJ,!pp!98P99!
16!Rawls!argues!that!“perhaps!the!most!important!primary!good!is!that!of!selfPrespect”!(TJ,!sec.!67).!Rawls!goes!on!
to!say!that!without!selfPrespect!people!will!doubt!their!own!worth!and!their!ability!to!carry!out!their!life!goals.!
Rawls!argues!in!both!TJ!and!PL!for!the!importance!of!selfPrespect:!
!
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equal (even if all were to have the same starting point), citizenship can. As such, Rawls’ thought 
is that equal citizenship can play the role of securing self-respect in a way that equalizing one’s 
wealth or status (via difference principle) in a social hierarchy never could. It is for this reason of 
providing a secure basis for self-respect that Rawls gives lexical priority to the liberty principle 
on a domestic level.17 For the purpose of securing self-respect, the liberty principle is given 
lexical priority, and the difference principle comes only after, and never at the expense of, the 
liberty principle. Rawls’ two domestic principles are as follows: 
First: each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive scheme of equal basic 
liberties compatible with a similar scheme of liberties for others [the liberty principle]. 
Second: social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are both (a) 
reasonably expected to be to everyone's advantage [the difference principle], and (b) 
attached to positions and offices open to all [the fair equality of opportunity principle].18 
By lexically ranking the liberty principle on the domestic level, Rawls shows his commitment to 
the primacy of self-respect over a difference principle. Rawls was also clear that not only was the 
difference principle to come second to the liberty principle, but that is was also intended to serve 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
The&importance&of&self<respect&is&that&it&provides&a&secure&sense&of&our&own&value,&a&firm&conviction&that&
our&determinate&conception&of&the&good&is&worth&carrying&out.&Without&self<respect&nothing&may&seem&
worth&doing,&and&if&some&things&have&value&for&us,&we&lack&the&will&to&pursue&them.&Thus,&the&parties&give&
weight&to&how&well&principles&of&justice&support&self<respect…!(PL,!p.!318).!
Emphasizing!the!importance!of!selfPrespect!on!a!domestic!level,!Rawls!gives!lexical!priority!to!the!liberty!principle!
over!a!difference!principle!and!argues!that!the!Priority!of!Liberty!serves!as!“the!basis!for!selfPrespect”!(TJ,!sec.!39).!
17!Note!that!priority!is!not!given!to!full!liberty,!but!equal!liberty!(e.g.,!not!full!liberty!of!conscience,!but!equal!liberty!
of!conscience).!
18!TJ,!p.!60,!(1971).!Rawls!puts!forth!the!full!and!final!version!of!these!principles!in!the!second!edition!of!TJ!(1999):!
First:&Each&person&is&to&have&an&equal&right&to&the&most&extensive&total&system&of&equal&basic&liberties&
compatible&with&a&similar&system&of&liberty&for&all.&
Second:&Social&and&economic&inequalities&are&to&be&arranged&so&that&they&are&both&(a)&to&the&greatest&
benefit&of&the&least&advantage,&consistent&with&the&just&savings&principle,&and&(b)&attached&to&positions&
open&to&all&under&conditions&of&fair&equality&of&opportunity.!!!
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as further support for it. Rawls in no uncertain terms expressed his commitment to the priority of 
self-respect over a difference principle domestically.  
While Rawls does not lexically rank his principles of international justice, we can 
nonetheless see a problem of consistency if the same principles were to be selected. Let us now 
consider the international situation. Just as with the domestic case, representatives of decent 
peoples behind the veil are deprived the knowledge not of the world itself, but of their place in it. 
Representatives know nothing of the strength, size, or relative level of development of their 
territory, nor do they have knowledge of its economic strengths or resources. Rawls believes this 
second original position would yield at least eight principles:  
(1) Peoples are free and independent, and their freedom and independence are to be 
respected by other peoples. (2) Peoples are to observe treaties and undertakings. (3) 
Peoples are equal and parties to the agreements that bind them. (4) Peoples are to observe 
a duty of non-intervention. (5) Peoples have the right of self-defense but no right to 
instigate war for reasons other than self-defense. (6) Peoples are to honor human rights. 
(7) Peoples are to observe certain specified restrictions in their conduct of war. (8) 
Peoples have a duty to assist other people living under unfavorable conditions that 
prevent their having a just or decent political and social regime.19 
While these are not lexically ranked, we still know something about Rawls’ priority in the 
international case. In the domestic case, Rawls gives priority to self-respect over a difference 
principle, as evidenced by his lexical ordering, and while Rawls does not lexically rank his 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
19!LP,!p.!37!
!
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international principles, he still gives priority to (collective) self-respect over a (global) 
difference principle. We know this because of his reasons for rejecting it: a global difference 
principle is a threat to a peoples’ self-determination insofar as it requires global institutions.  
Consistent with the spirit of TJ, in LP Rawls argues that a peoples’ self-respect cannot be 
tied to its wealth. Rawls argues that a peoples’ “wealth lies elsewhere; in their political and 
cultural traditions… and in their capacity for political and economic organization.”20 In other 
words, their collective self-respect is in some sense tied to their meaningful political projects. As 
two sides of the same coin, collective self-respect is tied also to the international recognition of a 
peoples’ cultural tradition and its meaningful way of life. So both a peoples’ way of life and the 
international recognition thereof is what collective self-respect is tied to.  
A global difference principle is a threat to a peoples’ self-determination in a way that a 
duty of assistance is not. While cosmopolitans see duty of assistance as objectionably minimalist, 
(indeed, they are right to say it is far from Rawls’ domestic egalitarianism), duty of assistance is 
not demanding enough to be a threat to a peoples’ meaningful political projects and ways of life. 
This is so because duty of assistance does not require the type of (global) institutions that the 
difference principle requires at a domestic level. Rawls says almost nothing about the demands 
of the duty of assistance, instead focusing on what the duty of assistance is intended to achieve.  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
20!Rawls,!“The!Law!of!Peoples,”!in!On&Human&Rights:&The&Oxford&Amnesty&Lectures,!ed.!(1993),!pp.!76P77.!Here!is!an!
extended!version!of!this!quote:!“Moreover,!the!problem!is!often!not!the!lack!of!natural!resources.!Many!societies!
with!unfavorable!conditions!don’t!lack!for!resources.!WellPordered!societies!can!get!on!with!very!little;!their!
wealth!lies!elsewhere;!in!their!political!and!cultural!traditions,!in!their!human!capital!and!knowledge,!and!in!their!
capacity!for!political!and!economic!organization.!Rather!the!problem!is!commonly!the!nature!of!the!public!political!
culture!and!the!religious!and!philosophical!traditions!that!underlie!its!institutions.!The!great!social!evils!in!the!
poorer!societies!are!likely!to!be!oppressive!government!and!corrupt!elites…!Perhaps!there!is!no!society!anywhere!
in!the!world!whose!people,!were!they!reasonably!and!rationally!governed,!could!not!have!a!decent!and!
worthwhile!life.”!!
!
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The purpose of the duty of assistance is to help burdened societies that otherwise do not enjoy 
the benefits of international social cooperation in the Society of Peoples to become self-
sufficient. As I said in the previous section, a peoples can be self-sufficient in a way that 
individual citizens cannot. As Rawls famously says, the aim of the duty of assistance has both a 
“target” and a “cut-off point”.21  
Once burdened societies are brought to a level of subsistence via the duty of assistance, 
not only is no further assistance required, but rather, according to Rawls, any further assistance is 
prohibited as overtly paternalistic and as an imposition of an ideal of justice that may run counter 
to a peoples’ right of collective self-determination. Given that a peoples’ self-respect is tied to its 
collective self-determination, selecting a global difference principle would violate earlier 
commitments to the priority and importance of self-respect. As such, contrary to cosmopolitan 
criticisms, consistency requires a different set of principles (namely without a global difference 
principle) be selected if Rawls is to stay true to his prior convictions.   
Acceptance on one level and rejection on another shows how both acceptance and 
rejection are attempts to secure the same end: the self-respect of a peoples on the international 
level and the self-respect of individuals on a domestic level. The acceptance of one and rejection 
of the other owes itself to the substantive differences mentioned above between the domestic and 
international situation, in tandem with the interests behind his order of lexical ranking. Put 
another way, Rawls is securing the interests behind the principle rather than the principle itself.  
CONCLUSION  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
21!For!Rawls’!emphasis!on!the!importance!of!a!“target!and!a!cutPoff!point”!for!international!distributive!justice,!see!
LP!pp.!115P19.!!
!
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Once burdened societies are brought to a level of subsistence, not only is no further assistance 
required, but rather, according to Rawls, any further assistance is prohibited as an imposition of 
an ideal that may run counter to a peoples’ right of collective self-determination. This, of course, 
may or may not be true in itself, but rather my point for mentioning this is to show that Rawls is 
in fact staying true to his prior intuitions. Cosmopolitans such as Brock who accept Rawls’ 
domestic justice while rejecting his international justice are forced to confront Rawls’ 
consistency, and then the onus is on them to give a more substantial explanation for how they 
themselves are not inconsistent.  
In this paper, I have argued that the consistency of Rawls’ domestic and international 
justice is not as threatened as Brock seems to suggest. I have done this by showing how two 
pieces of Rawls’ project work together: (1) the difference between peoples and individual 
citizens, and (2) the interests behind assigning lexical priority to the liberty principle. I have also 
argued, following others, that appreciating a richer sense of consistency can be accomplished by 
viewing Rawls’ rejection of a global difference principle, particularly its exchange for a “good 
enough” duty of assistance, as a continuation of his concern with overlapping consensus.   
One way to interpret the above could be to say that the cosmopolitan attempt to globalize 
the difference principle is unnecessary at best—given that Rawls’ duty of assistance obviates the 
need for a global difference principle—and misguided at worst—given the differences to Rawls 
between domestic and global conditions. Another way to interpret this could be to say that Rawls 
has loosened his strictures too much for the sake of securing an (international) overlapping 
consensus, for the sake of defining a realistic utopia, with the cost being a less distributively just 
global order than Rawls allows for domestically. I have hinted at these as possible 
!
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interpretations, but I have not taken up the more difficult task of claiming one over the other(s), 
nor would I know how I could begin to do so. But either way that this is taken, what we cannot 
say is that Rawls is inconsistent for rejecting at the international level what seemed to mean so 
much to him at the domestic.  
 
  
